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THE SCOPE OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
FOR GOOD-FAITH DEFAMATORY ERROR
In 1964 the United States Supreme Court imposed a constitutional
limitation on the power of the states to award libel damages to public
officials falsely defamed by critics of their official conduct. This limit
was established in New York Times v. Sullivan,' where the court held
that the first amendment's free speech protection required
a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct
unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice"
-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not.2
Attempts to apply this privilege to cases not involving public officials
have led to considerable difficulty in measuring the scope of this new
protection. The Supreme Court's decision in Rosenblatt v. Baer' is the
most recent example of the courts' inept handling of the privilege. The
primary reason for the difficulty is that the courts adhere to the "public
official" language of Times and fail to examine libel suits involving
good faith defamatory error in terms of the purposes of first amendment
protection.
In Times, the Public Safety Commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama
sued the New York Times for publishing statements in a political
advertisement soliciting funds for the defense of Martin Luther King,
Jr.4 The advertisement described numerous acts of repression by
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. Id. at 279-80. Three Justices-Black, Douglas, and Goldberg-concurred in the re-
sult, but felt the privilege accorded to critics of official public conduct should be absolute;
i.e., that even defamatory falsehoods knowingly made should be privileged. The scope of
this Note is limited to the proper applicability of the qualified, good-faith privilege as
set down in Times, although it is recognized that the concept of "actual malice" will be
difficult to apply. See, e.g., Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965).
3. 86 Sup. Ct. 669 (1966).
4. King had recently been indicted for perjury. The relevant paragraphs of the ad
stated:
In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang "My Country, 'Tis of Thee" on the
State Capital steps their leaders were expelled from school and truckloads of police
armed with shotguns and tear-gas ringed the Alabama State College Campus. When
the entire student body protested to state authorities by refusing to re.register, their
dining hall was padlocked in an attempt to starve them into submission ....
Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr. King's peaceful protests
with intimidation and violence. They have bombed his home almost killing his wife
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"Southern violators" against Negro demonstrators. Alleging that the
entire list of charges about these violators could be read as referring
to him in his role as police commissioner,a Sullivan demanded a re-
traction and then instituted suit. Some of the statements were proven
to be false,6 and the jury awarded Sullivan the full $500,000 claimed.
The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. It restated a position held by
a majority of states prior to this case: that the common law privilege of
"fair comment," which protected statements about matters of general
public concern, did not apply to misstatements of fact, but only to
expressions of opinion.
7
The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed the judgment,
holding that the first amendment required a federal rule protecting
good faith defamatory error about the official conduct of public officials
regardless of whether the error was made in a statement of fact or
opinion. In so holding, the Court declared that the basic purpose of
the first amendment was to guarantee full and free exchange on public
issues. This guarantee necessarily included protection of the right to
make "caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials." Without immunity for inadvertent error, "would-
be critics of official conduct might be deterred from voicing their
criticism" for fear of having to prove their statements true.
The Times opinion explicitly declined to discuss what was included
and child. They have assaulted his person. They have arrested him seven times-for
"speeding," "loitering," and similar "offenses." And now they have charged him with
"perjury"--a felony under which they could imprison him for ten years. (Emphasis
in original).
The ad was signed by various members of the "Committee to Defend Martin Luther
King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South." N.Y. Times, Mard 29, 1960, p. 25. The
ad is set out in the Appendix of the Times opinion, 376 U.S. at 292.
5. The lawyers for the Times asked for clarification from Sullivan, because they were
"puzzled" as to how the ad referred to him. Sullivan did not answer. At the trial, six
witnesses testified they had read the ad as referring to plaintiff in his role as Public
Safety Commissioner. Id. at 258. See also Pierce, The Anatomy of an Historic Decision:
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 43 N.C.L. REv. 315, 321 (1965).
6. Among the errors: King was arrested four times and not seven; the a' ault .as an
unproven inddent; the police had not "ringed" the campus (but had been deployed in
large numbers); most of the students had returned to classes the next day; and the din-
ing room had not been padlocked. Plaintiff was also permitted to show he had com-
mitted no bombings or assaults on the theory that the entire list of charges in the ad
could be read as referring to him. 376 U.S. at 259. The disturbing implications of this
method of proving false statements never directed at a plaintiff in the first place are dis-
cussed in Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the
First Amendment," 1964 Supmxsr CotURT REv. 191, 198-99 (194).
7. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 274 Ala. 656, 149 So. 2d 25 (1963).
8. 376 U.S. at 270.
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in the categories of "official conduct" or of "public official." D It is
apparent, however, that first amendment protection for good faith
defamatory error cannot be confined to the "official conduct of public
officials" scope of Times. The opinion itself recognized that a broad-
ening of the privilege would be inevitable. 10 And barely four months
later, the Court in Garrison v. Louisiana"' moved outside the official
conduct category by holding that a privilege was also applicable to criti-
cism "which might touch on an official's fitness for office ... 12 even if
the criticism was also personally defamatory.
Further, the purpose of the first amendment, as defined in Times
and elsewhere, precludes a limited scope for the privilege. The Supreme
Court in Times marshalled an array of historical and precedential
authority to support the proposition that the first amendment reflects
"a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.""'
Throughout, the opinion reaffirmed broad concepts of the first amend-
ment's reach. The Court noted the "general proposition that freedom
of expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amend-
ment' 14 and endorsed Justice Brandeis' concept of the free speech
principle that "public discussion is a political duty [and] ... that it is
hazardous to discourage thought, hope, and imagination . .. that the
path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed griev-
ances and proposed remedies...."I"
A series of first amendment cases buttresses the Times opinion's
premise that free speech protection secures free expression on all public
issues. More than 25 years ago the Court held that the goal of free
speech was "that men may speak as they think on matters vital to them"
and that discussion of "all matters of public concern without previous
restraint or fear of subsequent punishment" was a prime function of
the first amendment. 16
This concept of free speech strongly suggests that the "official con-
duct of public officials" category is part of, but not the limit of, the area
of speech which should be protected by the new privilege. Issues in
9. Id. at 283, n.23.
10. Ibid.
11. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
12. Id. at 77.
13. 376 U.S. at 270-71. (Emphasis added).
14. Id. at 269.
15. Id. at 270, citing Brandeis, J., concurring in Whitney v. Calif., 274 U.S. 357, 875-76
(1927).
16. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95, 101-2 (1940).
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which the public has a legitimate concern are not confined to exchanges
on an official level. Debate between private persons about the wisdom,
consequence, and worth of ideas is a vital part of the political and
social process. If this area of debate is to be "robust, wideopen, and
uninhibited,"'17 good faith defamatory errors made in discussions about
public issues should be privileged whether or not one of the participants
in the debate, or the object of the discussion, is a public official.
To state that the first amendment protects speech about "public
issues" is not to advance a proposition in a vacuum. Courts have long
had to determine whether a remark was of public, as opposed to purely
private, concern under the fair comment privilege.18 Under this privi-
lege, courts protect defamatory expressions of opinion from libel actions
when the expressions deal with "those matters which are of legitimate
concern to the community... because they materially affect the inter-
est of all the community.""' Such items as the management of public
institutions, the conduct of private enterprise affecting the general com-
munity, and the performance of those who submit their talents to the
public for approval have been held to be matters in which the public
has a legitimate concern.2 0 The courts can use this body of experience
in defining public issues even though the fair comment doctrine devel-
oped independently of first amendment holdings.2' Both the fair com-
ment doctrine and the first amendment reflect the principle that
individuals are not to be punished for speaking out on matters about
which they and the community at large have a legitimate interest. The
Times opinion itself relied on a noted fair comment decision in ex-
tending protection for defamatory falsehoods about public officials as
a Constitutional matter.22
17. See 576 US. at 278.
18. PRossm, ToRTs, § 110, p. 812 (3d ed. 1964). See also 1 HAma & JAmEs. Tors,
§ 5.28, pp. 456-57 (1956); Hallen, Fair Comment, 8 TxAs L REv. 41 (1929). Various juris-
dictions use the "fair comment" doctrine in different ways. Some, for example, use it to
distinguish cases in which a complainant must prove damages, rather than having the
court presume damage from publication. The suggested use of fair comment here is
limited to the utility of the doctrine in delineating public, as opposed to private, defa-
mation.
19. PRossER, op. cit. supra at 812. The majority of jurisdictions held that the privilege
applied only to expressions of opinion, and not to misstatements of fact. Prossm at 814,
1 HA",a & JAms, op. cit. supra at 458; REsTATEmENT, ToRTs § 606 comment b (1938).
The distinction has been most difficult to apply. Titus, Statement of Fact Versus State-
ment of Opinion-A Spurious Dispute in Fair Comment, 15 VAND. L REv. 1203 (1962).
20. PRossEn, op. cit. supra note 19, and cases compiled therein.
21. The Times opinion is the first attempt to impose a Constitutional requirement
for such a privilege. Previously, state court analyses were made in terms of the common
law of the jurisdiction.
22. See, e.g., the Times reliance on Coleman v. MacLennon, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281
1966]
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The lower courts which have attempted to apply the Times doctrine,
however, have tried to work within the language of the case, rather than
to implement the first amendment principles implicit in the opinion.
They have almost uniformly sought to apply or withhold the privilege
on the basis of whether the complainant was enough like a public
official to warrant the application of the Times rule.
An indication of this trend appeared in Gilberg v. Goffi.213 Gilberg,
a law partner of the Mayor of Mount Vernon, sued the defendant for
remarks made during the local election. Goffi, a candidate for local
office, had charged in a speech and in a letter to the local paper that
Gilberg's firm was engaged in legal practices which amounted to a
conflict of interests.24 In dismissing the complaint, the New York Ap-
pellate Division held that Gilberg's cause of action was "so closely
related" to a complaint based on criticism of a public official that he
had "no justiciable cause of action." The court reasoned that Gilberg,
"having entered the fray as champion of [his] law firm.... made him-
self as much a part of the local political campaign as did his law partner,
the Mayor." 25
The opinion in Pearson v. Fairbanks Publishing Co. 20 provides a
more extreme statement equating active private citizens with "public
officials." Syndicated columnist Drew Pearson sued the owner of an
Alaska newspaper for publishing editorials which announced the can-
cellation of Pearson's columns and called him "the garbage man of the
fourth estate." The editorials charged that almost "every single thing
he ever said about Alaska has been inaccurate in whole or in part.12 1
The court noted that the controversy arose during an election campaign
in which plaintiff and defendant had supported opposing candidates.
Since the Times rule clearly extended to candidates for public office,
the court found
no reasonable basis to exempt those who presume to speak for such
candidates, particularly those public figures of international
stature . . . [Pearson], a public figure and internationally known
newspaperman and radio columnist of no mean proportion, should
occupy the same standing in the law of libel as Senator Gruening,
whose cause he was publicly supporting. There can be little ques-
(1908), a noted fair comment case applying a privilege for defamatory falsehoods, quoted
in 376 U.S. at 280-82.
23. 21 App. Div. 2d 517, 251 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1964).
24. The charge was made in the course of a campaign discussion on the need for a
local ordinance prohibiting conflict of interest situations.
25. 251 N.Y.S.2d at 831.
26. 33 U.S.L. WEEK 2307 (Alaska Super. Ct., Nov. 25, 1964).
27. Pearson v. Fairbanks Publishing Co. Appendix B (original unreported opinion).
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tion that candidate Gruening could have been so assailed with
impunity.... If Senator Gruening could be attacked, so could one
of his outspoken supporters.28
In its most recent libel case, the Supreme Court also made the com-
plainant's status the central relevant inquiry. In Rosenblatt v. Baer,3 a
case tried before the Times decision, the former supervisor of a New
Hampshire county recreation area was awarded damages on the basis
of a column in a local newspaper praising the new management. Com-
menting on the "tremendous difference in net cash result," Rosenblatt
had written, "What happened to all the money last year? and every
other year?" 30 The Supreme Court remanded the case for a new trial in
order to determine whether or not the statement should be protected
by the principles of Times. The Court thought there were two funda-
mental principles, "first, a strong interest in debate on public issues,
and second, a strong interest in debate about those persons who are in
a position significantly to influence the resolution of those issues." 3'
In spite of the recognition that there is an interest in free debate about
public officials and public affairs, the Court did not direct the trial court
to determine not whether the statement was made concerning a public
issue, but to determine only whether the complaining party was a public
official. Perhaps the Supreme Court viewed the "public official" and
"public issue" categories as coterminous. 32 But in any event the inquiry
required by the Court in Rosenblatt is an inept one to implement the
policies of the first amendment.
The use of the "public official" classification may lead to the pro-
tection of good-faith statements which falsely defame an individual and
which serve no public purpose justifying a first amendment privilege.
Once the public official label attaches to an individual almost any
statement about him might be privileged. In Garrison v. Louisiana, the
first libel case after Times, the Supreme Court said:
[a]ny criticism of the manner in which a public official performs
his duties will tend to affect his private, as well as his public
reputation. The New York Times rule is not rendered inappli-
cable merely because an official's private reputation, as well as his
28. Id. at 5. The confusion in the opinion is partially indicated by the citations of
the Times case, which privileges good-faith errors, and the Restatement of Torts, which
does not.
29. 86 Sup. Ct. 669 (1966).
30. Id. at 672.
31. Id. at 675.
32. The opinion stated that a non-Times definition of malice "is constitutionally in-
sufficient where discussion of public affairs is concerned." Id. at 8. (Emphasis added.)
1966]
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public reputation, is harmed. The public official rule protects the
paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the
people concerning public officials, their servants. To this end, any-
thing which might touch on an official's fitness for office is rele-
vant. Few personal attributes are more germane to fitness for office
than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motivation, even though
these characteristics may also affect the official's private character.31
Statements about morality, prior political affiliations, and personal
tastes may also "touch on" the private citizen's fitness to perform his
public role. Although Garrison does not compel this reading, it is not
an unreal possibility.
Allowing such a wide variety of statements to be made about anyone
who fits within the public official category ignores a basic policy of
privacy which limits policies of free discussion. As Mr. Justice Stewart
noted, concurring in Rosenblatt, the first amendment is not the sole
value in the field of defamation.
The right of a man to protection of his own reputation from un-
justified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our
basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human
being.
34
In order to override this interest in protecting individuals from false
defamation about their private lives, there must be a reasonable
relationship between what is discussed and how the individual affects
the public.
To illustrate this danger of the public official test, suppose that a
local roadbuilder with a public contract were accused of being a homo-
sexual. Under the approach used by the courts thus far, the roadbuilder
would almost certainly fall under the public official category. The
courts would then apply the syllogism they have used in the past: good
faith statements about public officials are privileged; this statement is
about a public official; therefore, the statement is privileged. Using
the suggested relevancy standard, though, the statement would not be
privileged. Good faith claims that the roadbuilder is dishonest or
incompetent relate directly to his performance as a roadbuilder and
thus to his effect on the public at large. Claims about his sexual traits,
on the other hand, do not. And because the public has no interest in
the private sex life of the roadbuilder, there is no occasion for the first
amendment to protect defamatory falsehoods about such topics.
Properly understood, Garrison supports this claim that, to be priv-
33. 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964).
34. 86 Sup. Ct. at 679.
[Val. 75:642
GOOD-FAITH DEFAMATORY ERROR
ileged, statements about private characteristics must relate to the
individual's public role. In that case, Garrison, a New Orleans District
Attorney, was convicted of criminal defamation for castigating local
judges who allegedly blocked his investigations of disreputable night
spots. He had charged that their actions raised "interesting questions
about the racketeer influences on our eight vacation-minded judges."3 5
Garrison's statements were made about judges, who are in fact public
officials. The Court's catalogue of relevant subjects should be read in
this context only. When other kinds of public figures are involved, the
Court's reasoning in Garrison requires us to consider different kinds of
statements relevant. Unlike the public official, the private citizen is not,
by virtue of his presence in the public sphere, a servant of the people;
he does not "offer" the totality of his character and personal integrity
for judgment. Thus, there will be many aspects of his private life which
are irrelevant to his public role. To hold that active private citizens are
entitled to no more protection in the law of libel than are public offi-
cials36 requires that an individual who enters the public arena give up
as much of his private reputation as the public official.3 7 This formu-
lation undercuts the complex and diverse tensions between an indi-
vidual's right to privacy and the public's right to information.38 More-
over, allowing personally defamatory remarks about private individuals
would discourage these citizens from speaking out and would thereby
subvert the purpose of the first amendment.30
A more serious difficulty with focusing on the "public official"
category is that speech which the first amendment was designed to
protect may be punished. If the court recognizes that the citizen com-
35. 379 U.S. at 66 (1964).
36. See, e.g. Wright, J., concurring in Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, - F.2d
33 U.S.L. "WM 2634 (D.C. Cir., May 27, 1965). "When a private dtizen enters the
public arena, he is entitled to no more protection against libel than a public offidal."
37. Nowhere does the Rosenblatt opinion recognize the sweeping effect of Garrison
in the field of private defamation if all citizens active in public affairs are subject to the
same broad relevancy standard as are public ofidals. The Court's approach continues to
assume that the public offidal approach will strike a proper balance between free discuz-
sion and a good reputation.
38. See generally Brandeis & Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HALv. L REv. 193
(1890).
39. Reisman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Comment, 42 CoLum.
L. REv. 1085, 1088-89 (1942). The danger to free debate in discouraging private citizens
from speaking out through fear of private defamation, or lies, did not deter Justice Black
from stating in Rosenblatt, for the first time in a court opinion, that all libel laws were
barred by the first and fourteenth amendments. 86 Sup. Ct. at 680. See also Cahn & Black,
Justice Black and First Amendment Absolutes; A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U.L REv. 549,
557 (1962).
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plainant is not a "public official" the court may well refuse to protect
the statement regardless of its public nature. The Rosenblatt majority,
for example, remanded the case for a new trial at which "the judge...
[will] determine whether the proofs show respondent to be a 'public
official.' "40 Presumably, if the respondent is not found to be a "public
official," the statements will be actionable. Thus a columnist making a
good-faith statement about the financial affairs of a publicly financed
ski resort might be held liable for defamation.
Harper v. National Review41 is evidence that this possibility is real.
In that case the late professor of law at Yale sued the conservative bi-
weekly for an attack on a petition signed by Harper criticizing U.S.
policy in Vietnam. The editorial charged that, whether or not the
signers were actual Communists, "the objective fact is that these persons
we have named, and many others like them have given aid and comfort
to the enemies of this country."
42
The court denied defendant's motion to dismiss. In so doing, the
court rejected the magazine's contention that "the basic rationale of
[Times] is that critics of a public official enjoy a privilege which should
be extended to debates on public issues by defenders of the public
against persons who speak out on public issues."43 The court's view
was more limited:
"Unlimited, robust, and wide-open debate" of public issues per-
taining to public officials does not privilege defamation of private
parties by falsehood under the present state of the law. Fair com-
ment needs neither defamation nor falsehood to be robust or
informative of the actions of private individuals or to conserve the
public interest. No public convenience or necessity appears in the
record at this time to require a privilege to defame with falsehood
when the debate is among private parties only.44
Harper's "public official" test assumes that defamation of any sort about
a private person must be private by definition, and that once a person
can be located outside the "public official" category, defamatory com-
ment about him cannot be privileged. Thus the court would punish the
National Review for publishing its view of how Harper's public state-
ment might affect this country's foreign policy. It is the evident intent
of the first amendment to protect this kind of publication.
4
40. 86 Sup. Ct. at 677.
41. 33 U.S.L. WEEK 2341 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Dec. 22, 1964).
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Id. at 2341-42.
45. Justice Douglas pointed out this danger in his Rosenblatt concurrence when he
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Neither does the "public official" test adequately protect criticism of
authors, entertainers, athletes, and a myriad of others who offer their
talent for public judgment, but who could not fit into a "public official"
category. It would strain that label to the breaking point to include
these sorts of "public men."40 Yet the fair comment doctrine has always
recognized that, although separate from the political concerns of the
community, the quality of whatever talent or skill these people offer to
the public is a legitimate subject for community discussion. Similarly,
the first amendment has never been limited to political matters.4 7 Nor
is there any reason now to limit the scope of the amendment.
Thus the "public official" test proves too indiscriminate. It may
protect too much; or it may protect too little. It neither protects private
citizens against unjustified intrusions into their private lives, nor
protects the full freedom of speech on public issues demanded by the
first amendment.4s A different approach is needed which better accom-
plishes these two functions.
The essence of the Times privilege is that citizens may not be pun-
ished for good faith statements about public issues. The inquiry in any
libel case must, therefore, be directed toward whether the alleged libel
concerned a matter legitimately within the public's concern. There are
two ways for a matter to come within the public realm. First, a state-
ment may be confined to an issue of public concern without dealing
with the private traits of an individual. Second, a statement may in-
said, "so long as we are fashioning a rule of free discussion of public issues, I cannot
relate it only to those who, by the Court's standards, are deemed to hold public office...
The question is whether a public issue, not a public official, is involved." 86 Sup. CLt. at 678.
46. See Coleman v. MacLennon, 78 Kan. 711, at 723, 98 P. 281 at 285 (1903).
47. See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 US. 184, 190 (1964); Roth v. United States, 354
US. 476, 484, 487 (1957).
48. The refusal of the court to apply broad first amendment grounds may also result
in a confusing multiplication of federal limits on state libel laws, rather than limiting
federal restrictions to the Constitutional realm. In Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers,
86 Sup. Ct. 657 (1966), the Supreme Court held that the National Labor Relations Act did
not bar state courts from hearing libel suits arising out of a union organizing campaign. In
order, however, to accommodate "the federal interest in uniform regulation of labor rela-
tions with the traditional concern and responsibility of the State to protect its citizens
against defamatory attacks," the Court held that, whatever the state libel laws, Linn would
would have to prove that he was damaged by the statements and would also have to
prove malice. Id. at 660 nn.2, 7.
This resolution suggests that every time a libel suit arises in an area where the fed-
eral government has asserted an interest, different adjustment of state libel laws will have
to be made to "accommodate" the federal interests: one for the public official, one for
the labor leader, another for the executive of a federally regulated utility, etc. A "public
issues" test, on the other hand, would restrict the alteration of state laws to the basic
question of whether the subject matter of the speech was within an area protected by
the first amendment.
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volve a private trait which is sufficiently relevant to the public role of
the complainant to make that trait a public issue.
The first step of the suggested inquiry, then, is for the judge to
examine not the status of the complainant but the subject matter of
the alleged libel. Using the fair comment doctrine as a guide,49 the
court should determine first whether the statement was confined to the
public arena and directed only at a matter of community concern
unaccompanied by personally defamatory comment. If the words com-
plained of were not directed at a private trait of a complainant, the
remark must be privileged regardless of the status of the complainant.50
Under the first inquiry, the courts need not have undertaken the
tangled question of whether Harper, Pearson, or Gilberg were or were
not public officials. In each of these cases, the statements were about
public issues, and made no reference to a private trait of the com-
plainants. Professor Harper was being chastised for his political
position. Clearly, the position which Harper espoused, and therefore
criticism of it, was a matter of public concern. The harshness of the
criticism did not alter the nature of the remarks. Drew Pearson was
attacked solely on the basis of his accuracy and his choice of topics for
his column. Again, it seems clear that the quality of news reporting is
an issue in which the public has a legitimate interest. None of the
statements Pearson complained about were directed at his personal
characteristics, but related to him only as he affected the quality of
reporting. Complainant Gilberg was simply a member of a law firm
which had become a subject of public discussion because one of the
partners was the Mayor of the community and there was concern about
a possible conflict of interest.
Of course it is possible to draw inferences about private traits from
any of these statements. For example Gilberg might claim that state-
ments about his law firm implicated his personal integrity. But almost
any statement about a public issue may radiate into someone's private
life. If these possible radiations were enough to make criticism action-
49. See text accompanying notes 19-23, supra. Courts may have to give the determi-
nation of what is "public" a somewhat broader definition than that contained In the
fair comment doctrine if that doctrine does not properly provide the "breathing space"
necessary for the survival of First Amendment freedoms. N.A.A.CP. v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 433 (1963).
50. Some good faith misstatements of fact may not be privileged even though they
do not refer to "private" traits. For example, in trade libel (also known as "injurious
falsehood," "disparagement of property," "slander of goods') where the business Is not a
matter of public concern aspersions on the quality of a product or the character of a
business and statements that a businessman has died or gone out of business, among
others, are actionable. See PROSSER, TORTS 938-50 (3d ed. 1964).
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able, the Times privilege would be meaningless. In order to make a
statement suspect the implication about private traits should be neces-
sary and direct. One part of the Rosenblatt opinion dealt with an
analogous problem. Baer claimed that Rosenblatt's column which criti-
cized the performance of the publicly-owned local ski resort's previous
management could be read as an attack on Baer's personal honesty
since Baer was one of the former managers. Mr. Justice Brennan
rejected this contention, and, relying on Times, he held that "[t]here
must be evidence showing that the attack was read as specifically
directed at plaintiff [Baer]."' l Brennan went on to explain,
Were the statement at issue in this case an explicit charge that
the Commissioners and Baer or the entire area management were
corrupt, we assume without deciding that any number of the
identified group might recover. The statement itself might be
sufficient evidence that the attack was specifically directed at each
individual. Even if a charge and reference were merely implicit,
as it is alleged here, but a plaintiff could show by extrinsic proofs
that the statement referred to him, it would be no defense to a suit
by one member of an identifiable group engaged in governmental
activity that another was also attacked. These situations are dis-
tinguishable from the present cases; ... Here, no explicit charge
of peculation was made; no assault on the previous management
appears. The jury was permitted to award damages upon a finding
merely that respondent was one of a small group acting for an
organ of government, only some of whom were implicated, but all
of whom were tinged with suspicion. In effect, this permitted the
jury to find liability merely on the basis of his relationship to the
government agency, the operations of which were the subject of
discussion. It is plain that the elected Commissioners, also mem-
bers of that group, would have been barred from suit on this
theory under... Times. They would be required to show specific
reference. Whether or not respondent was a public official, as a
member of the group he bears the same burden. A theory that the
column casts indiscriminate suspicion on the members of the group
responsible for the conduct of this government operation is
tantamount to a demand for recovery based on libel of govern-
ment, and therefore is constitutionally insufficient. 2
By similar reasoning a statement about a public issue should be
actionable only when a complainant makes a strong showing that the
statement was directed at or necessarily implied a criticism of a private
trait.53 If this test is met, the courts should then ask whether the com-
51. 86 Sup. Ct. at 673.
52. Id. at 673-74.
53. This approach would thus privilege the statements in the Gilberg and Pearson
cases, as did the court's. But it would avoid the identification of all public citizens as
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plainant has assumed any public role 54 and whether the trait dis-
cussed is relevant to that role. Here too, the fair comment doctrine
provides some guidelines. In a series of cases involving authors, enter-
tainers, businessmen, and other public figures, the courts have generally
held that critics may not "follow into ... domestic life" but have wide
latitude in dealing with personal characteristics which have a definite
relation to the public role being performed.r5
It is, of course, possible to imagine arguments which would make
any private trait relevant to any public role. The defendant in the
hypothetical case involving a roadbuilder falsely accused of homo-
sexuality could allege that homosexuality indicates immorality; that
immorality might manifest itself in other ways, for example, dis-
honesty; and that the public's right to know about dishonest road-
builders falls within the area of protected first amendment criticisms.
The judgment of relevance, though, should be much more stringent.
The courts should demand that the defendant show a relationship on
the basis of evidence and not on the basis of an artificially, albeit
imaginatively, constructed connection. The injury to individuals and
to the climate of public discussion is too great to permit personally
defamatory falsehood to go unpunished when no overriding public
interest is served.
An example of a case where the relevancy standard might apply is
Dempsey v. Time, Inc. 6 The former heavyweight champion sued
Sports Illustrated Magazine for an article which alleged that Dempsey's
trainer had "loaded" his gloves with plaster of paris, enabling him to
win the championship in 1919. The court thought that the Times
privilege might well extend to "current issues of grave public concern,"
but added
public officials-an identification which might well have undesirable results. Se text ac.
companying notes 34-41, supra.
54. The determination of whether complainant occupied a public role might involve
a determination similar to that performed by courts in judging whether or not a plain-
tiff was a public official. However, the determination of "public role" is made only after
it has been found that the statement contained a private defamation. Thus the courts
avoid the danger in the public official approach that statements on purely public issues
would be made actionable. See text accompanying notes 43-47, supra. Further, the strict
standards of relevancy to be applied will allow courts to make a more honest inquiry
into the complainant's public role since he will not be subject to a wide variety of private
defamations.
55. See generally Hallen, Fair Comment, 8 TmcAs L. REv. 41 (1929), and cases com-
piled therein. For an amusing and celebrated example, see Cherry v. Des Moines Leader,
114 Iowa 298, 86 N.W. 323 (1901).
56. 43 Misc. 2d 754, 252 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sup. Ct., 1964).
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... that the reaching back 45 years, as was done in the instant
case, is not within the purview of even the suggested extension....
This court is not prepared to hold that because of the mere fact
that one is a public individual he may be exposed to naked
libel.... 57
The time element cited by the court does not take the statement out of
the public issue category. Historical events, in and out of the political
world, may continue to be of public interest, and new light on a well-
known athletic contest cannot be said to be outside the ambit of con-
stitutional protection. That phase of the subject-matter, at least, should
be well within the protected area of discussion. However, in this case
it is possible that the statement, although directed to a discussion of a
public issue, also could be read as casting aspersions on Dempsey's
personal integrity. The statement could be read sensibly as impugning
Dempsey's personal honesty and accusing him of participating in an
immoral scheme rather than as criticizing his punching ability or
footwork. This reading is neither strained nor unreal.58
Since the court would find defamation of a personal nature in
Dempsey it would then have to determine the relevancy of the remark
to Dempsey's public role. The court would find that the statement bore
the most direct relationship to that phase of Dempsey's life "offered"
for public scrutiny, his performance as a prize fighter. Dempsey himself
had created a legitimate public interest by performing for public
attention and financial reward. Thus, absent a finding of actual malice,
the privilege should apply.
The court's role in applying the Times privilege within the already
tangled field of defamation 9 will not be easy, particularly in deter-
mining relevancy. There is a wide variety of private citizens active in
the public arena. In addition to public figures, commentators, and
entertainers, those who run large businesses or labor unions, and those
who operate quasi-public institutions such as charities and foundations
57. 43 MAisc. 2d at 756-57.
58. Dempsey illustrates the possibility that a statement may involve both a public
issue and a private trait. For example, suppose the defendant in the roadbuilder case had
said, "X ought not to get the construction contract, because the last road he built cracked
and he is a homosexual." Although the remark was about a public issue (who should
get the contract) and it was in part public (the builder's competency), it also contained
a defamation about an irrelevant private trait. In such a case, the court must clearly
hold that part of the statement which was private actionable. Otherwise every private
defamation would be privileged as long as the speaker had included it within a general
discussion of a public issue.
59. See Pnossx,, ToRTs, § 106, p. 754 (3d ed. 1964).
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all have a massive impact on society.60 Moreover, as a result of govern-
ment's increasing involvement in the nation's economic and social life,
the public has an interest in an ever-widening sphere of activities.01
Private organizations frequently receive large sums of money through
government contracts or subsidies. Occupations are subject to public
supervision. The applicability of the first amendment to these figures
should be clear; Coleman v. MacLennon, 2 a case on which both Times
and Garrison rely, noted that the privilege "extends to a great variety
of subjects and includes matters of public concern . . . (and) public
men."
6 3
In each case, relevancy must be determined by the involvement in
and effect on community life. This inquiry is not simple; nor is it cer-
tain. It is, however, the most promising method of giving life to the
first amendment command that public issues are committed to the
citizenry for full and free discussion.
60. See generally, Reich, The New Property, 73 YALn L.J. 733 (1964).
61. The suggested approach would thus cover cases like Linn, note 48 supra:
Surely the public importance of collective bargaining puts labor as well as manage-
ment into the public arena so far as the present constitutional issue is concerned.
Douglas, J., concurring in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 86 Sup. Ct. at 677.
62. 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908).
63. 78 Kan. at 723, 98 P. at 285. See also Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law
of Libel: The Modern Revised Translation, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 587 (1964); Comment, 12
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1420 (1965).
